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FEATURE ARTICLES
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the
Federal Arbitration Act: the Quintessential
Chevron Case
By Daniel G. Lloyd*

I. Introduction
Arbitration clauses are more and more prevalent in today's
commercial world.' Creditors and merchants prefer the arbitral forum
due to the lower likelihood of exposure to large judgments, even in
the wake of systematic misconduct.2 Additional reasons, perhaps
equally as compelling, include losing the right to a jury, the
unavailability of pursuing a class action, discovery limitations, filing
fees, and the inability to appeal an erroneous interpretation of lawall hindering the consumer's pursuit of redress. 3 One commentator
*
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1 JOHN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW: LEMON LAW, MAGNUSON-MOSS, UCC, MOBILE
HOME, AND OTHER WARRANTY STATUTES § 10.2.1.3 (2d ed. 2001).
2

Id.

3 Id. For example the consumer has a privilege to proceed in court in forma

pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2000), whereas the American Arbitration
Association consumer rules require the consumer to pay half of the arbitrator's fee,
see SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES C-8
(American Arbitration Association, effective on July 1, 2003), available at
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even dubbed arbitration the "death knell" of consumer protection.4
Currently, the effort to avoid arbitration in a consumer setting is one
of the most frequently contested issues. 5
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("Magnuson-Moss") 6 is
the consumer's federal weapon to combat a breach of warranty. On
its face Magnuson-Moss appears to give the consumer an
"unwaivable right of access" to the judiciary for a breach of warranty
claim.7 However, the Federal Arbitration Act ("Arbitration Act")'
resides only a few volumes away in the United States Code. The
Arbitration Act, conversely, requires courts to enforce agreements to
arbitrate. 9
Chief Judge King of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
proclaimed in her dissent in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC 10
that the clash between Magnuson-Moss
and the Arbitration Act is a
"classic Chevron case."' 1 Referring to the cornerstone administrative
law case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.,12 Chief Judge King recognized that courts should defer to the
Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC" or "Commission") longstanding
view that final and binding arbitration clauses have no place near a
warranty.13 Stated another way, the judiciary has the last word on a

http://www.adr.org.
4 Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal Titans: The Federal Arbitration
Act v. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act-Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 4, 21 (2001).
5 SHELDON&

supra note 1, § 10.2.1.1.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 101-112, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
2301-12 (2000)). Title II of Magnuson-Moss enhanced the scope of the FTC's
power with the purpose of allowing the agency to better protect consumers. See
H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7702
CARTER,

6

[hereinafter "MMWA HOUSE REP."].
7 SHELDON & CARTER,

supra note 1, § 10.2.6.5; accord 15 U.S.C. §
2310(a)(3).
8 United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 66-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)).
9 9 U.S.C. § 2.
10 Walton

v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002).

1 Id. at 480 (King, C.J., dissenting).
12 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13

Walton, 298 F.3d at 490 (King, C.J., dissenting).
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Magnuson-Moss breach of warranty claim. Conversely, two federal
appellate courts in 2002, the Fifth Circuit in Walton and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc.,

held that claims under Magnuson-Moss could be subject to predispute binding arbitration clauses, 14 forever barring those consumers
from seeking judicial redress.
The interplay between the right to bring a statutory rights
claim to court and the Arbitration Act's mandate to enforce
arbitration agreements is not new to American jurisprudence.15 Yet,
the Supreme Court has never addressed Magnuson-Moss'
relationship to the Arbitration Act, 16 and only recently have lower
courts begun to examine the issue. Prior to 2002, every federal
court that addressed the issue held that Magnuson-Moss
demonstrated Congress' intent to leave the consumer with a public
forum for breach of warranty claims.1 8 State courts are jarringly
divided on the issue. 19

Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1633 (2003); Walton, 298 F.3d at 479.
15 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953) (addressing issue of
14

whether securities claim could be arbitrated), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
16 Parkerson v. Smith, 2000-CA-00549-SCT,
9, 817 So. 2d 529, 532 (Miss.
2002).
17

See, e.g., Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1537 (M.D.

Ala. 1997) (noting that, in 1997, the issue was new to the courts), aff'd without
opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11 th Cir. 1997), abrogatedby Davis, 305 F.3d at 1271-72.
18 See, e.g., Yeomans v. Homes of Legend, Inc., No. 00-D-824-N, 2001 WL
237313, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2001) (upholding Waverlee and denying
arbitration of MMWA claims); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F.
Supp. 2d 958, 965 (W.D. Va. 2000) (binding arbitration agreement between mobile
home seller and consumer unenforceable as it was "[c]ontrary to the mandate of the
Magnuson-Moss Act"); Raesly v. Grand Housing, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 562, 573
(S.D. Miss. 2000) ("binding arbitration of written warranties, in transactions to
which the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies, is forbidden by that Act"); Boyd
v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1441 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that
while non-written warranties may be subject to binding arbitration, "Congress did
intend to preclude binding arbitration in the context of written warranties under
certain circumstances"), remanded on other grounds, 188 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th
Cir. 1999) (federal district court lacked jurisdiction by considering punitive
damages for amount in controversy requirement); see also NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS § 5.2.2.5.1 (2002).
19Compare Boroweic v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 772 N.E.2d 256, 260-61 (11I.
App. Ct. 2002), appeal allowed, 786 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. Oct. 2, 2002); Parkerson,
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Only one court, however, has discussed Chevron in light of
the Supreme Court's recent elucidations in United States v. Mead
Corp.20 and the 2002 case, Barnhart v. Walton.21 In Rickard v.
Teynor's Homes, Inc. the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio followed Chief Judge King's rationale from
Walton and held the judiciary was bound to accept the "FTC's
expertise and interpretation" of Magnuson-Moss.22 Most courts that
discuss Chevron at all either accept the regulations on face value 23 or
reject them claiming unreasonableness without nary an explanation of
what constitutes "unreasonable." 24 In short, no court has adequately
explained Chevron's appropriate place in the context of MagnusonMoss. 25 The sharp division among the lower courts will likely induce
2000-CA-00549-SCT,
8-21, 817 So. 2d at 532-35; Philyaw v. Platinum Enters.,
Inc., No. CLOO-236, 2001 WL 112107, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 9, 2001); with Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Turner, 796 So. 2d 295 (Ala. 2001); S.Energy Homes, Inc.
v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000); Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538
S.E.2d 73, 81 (Ga. Ct, App. 2000), aff'd, 548 S.E.2d 342, 343 (Ga. 2001); Howell
v. Cappaert Manufactured Hous., Inc., 2002-0165, at 5-6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/5/02),
819 So. 2d 461, 464-65, writ denied, 2002-1870 (La. 10/25/02); In re Am.
Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 492 (Tex. 2001).
20

533 U.S. 218 (2002).

21

535 U.S. 212 (2002).

See Rickard v. Teynor's Homes, Inc., No. 3:03CV7018, 2003 WL
22060320, at *8 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 25, 2003). Rickard did not mention Barnhart,
but its administrative law analysis relied on both Chevron and Mead. See Rickard,
2003 WL 22060320, at *8.
23 See, e.g., Parkerson,2000-CA-00549-SCT,
16, 817 So. 2d at 534 (noting
22

that Chevron required the court to accept reasonable agency interpretations). It
should be noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court characterized the 1999 FTC
Final Action interpreting Magnuson-Moss as a "regulation." Id. The FTC, however,
noted that its view was interpretive only, and did not carry the force of law. See
Notice of Final Action, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,700 (FTC Apr. 22, 1999)
(describing the notice as "advisory in nature").
24 See, e.g., Lancaster, 50 S.W.3d at 490-91 ("[W]hile we may defer to an
agency's interpretation of the statute it administers... we owe no such deference
when the agency's interpretation is unreasonable.").

25 Commentators either have shied away from Chevron's import, see, e.g.,
Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as Reflected in the
Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the FederalArbitrationAct, 15
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 173, 241-44 (2003) (concluding judicial decisions such as
Davis and Walton are flawed, but commenting only briefly on Chevron), or have
examined Chevron without any substantial reference to its recent elucidations, e.g.,
Katie Wiechens, Comment, Arbitrating Consumer Claims Under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 68 U. C1. L. REv. 1459, 1476 (2001) (concluding FTC

20031
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26
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the issue in the near future.
Professor Guerin christened the interplay between Magnuson27
Moss and the Arbitration Act as the "Clash of the Federal Titans.
However, two other federal titans will clash once the issue reaches
the Supreme Court-Chevron and its progeny on one hand, and the
"McMahon" inquiry, 28 which the Court systematically has used to
strike down attempts to overcome the Arbitration Act, on the other.
Notwithstanding, neither this author, nor the FTC for that
matter, argue that agreements to arbitrate Magnuson-Moss claims are
always unenforceable. Such an agreement would always be
permissible if entered into post-dispute, 29 just as if it were a
settlement agreement. Moreover, an arbitration agreement would
certainly be permissible so long as the consumer could pursue a civil
action in court after the arbitral proceeding. 30 However, pre-dispute
final and binding arbitration agreements, entered into at the time of
purchase when the consumer is hardly aware of his rights upon the
product's failure, are prohibited.3
This article argues that the early judicial approach to the
relationship between Magnuson-Moss and the Arbitration Act is
flawed because of its continued ignorance of the proper deference
owed to the FTC's regulatory interpretations of Magnuson-Moss.
Part II will examine the history of judicial deference to administrative
agency statutory interpretation, specifically focusing on Chevron and
its most recent elucidations. Part III will discuss the relationship
between Magnuson-Moss and its corresponding FTC regulations and
interpretations. Part IV will examine the history of the Arbitration

regulations are not entitled to any deference because they are contrary to Congress'
intent in the Arbitration Act).
26 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 (1987). Although the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Davis, see 123 S. Ct. 1633 (2003), this author predicts that the
Court will eventually address the issue as more and more appellate courts produce
conflicting views.
27 Guerin, supra note 4, at 4.
28

See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.

29 Accord Disclosure of Written Consumer Product Warranty Terms and
Conditions, Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty Terms, and Informal Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,211 (FTC Dec. 31, 1975)
[hereinafter "FTC IDSM Promulgation"].
30 See infra Part III.B.2.
3 See infra Part V.
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Act along with the jurisprudence addressing the arbitrability of rights
grounded in federal law. Finally, Part V will combine MagnusonMoss and corresponding FTC regulations with the correct Chevron
approach, demonstrating that a proper consideration of Chevron
adequately resolves this quandary that seems to have plagued recent
decisions. It will also argue that Magnuson-Moss overrides the
Arbitration Act's mandate even using the traditional three-factor
inquiry the Supreme Court employs.

II. Judicial Deference and the Chevron Doctrine
Chief Justice Marshall pronounced long ago that it was
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."'32 Nevertheless, the complexity of a statutory
scheme often leaves a court with no option but to defer to the
expertise and interpretation of an administrative agency. 33 Even Chief
Justice Marshall himself recognized after Marbury v. Madison that
courts should respect an executive department's view. 34 Essentially,
Congress enacts a statute setting general guidelines and gives the
agency the power to "fill up the details." 35 The Supreme Court
recognized as early as 1896 that courts should give the utmost respect
to an agency's construction of its enabling statute, eslecially when
the act is susceptible to more than one interpretation. The case of
Webster v. Luther, while instructing courts to follow the agency
interpretation in doubtful cases, 37 held that an agency still could not
construe an act of Congress in a manner that would render the
underlying purpose of the statute meaningless. 38 Nevertheless, the
Court has recognized that certain statutory schemes require
administrative agencies to promulgate
regulations and form policies
39
to fill any gaps left by Congress.
32

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).

33

Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125

(1984).
34 United States v. Vowell & M'Clean, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 372 (1809)
(Marshall, C.J.).
35 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517
(1911).
36

Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342 (1896).

37 Id.

38 id.
39

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
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A. Chevron as the Trendsetter in Administrative Law
The Supreme Court case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,40 dubbed by a leading treatise as
"one of the most important decisions in the history of administrative
law,' set the standard for the level of deference owed to an agency
interpretation. In Chevron the Court addressed the specific issue of
whether an Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") construction
of the term "stationary sources" was within Section 172(b)(6) of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 42 The Court ultimately held that
the EPA's decision to permit states to group all pollution-emitting
devices within an industry as though encased in a single "bubble"
was a reasonable construction
of the Clean Air Act Amendments as it
43
was grounded in policy.
Chevron is known for two major contributions to
administrative law, both of which are relevant to resolving the
Magnuson-Moss/Arbitration Act controversy: first, it established
what is commonly referenced as the "Chevron two-step" ;44 second,
and perhaps more important, Justice Stevens' opinion for a
unanimous court45 established the level of deference a court should
46
give an agency interpretation.
The Chevron two-step refers to the two questions a court
faces when reviewing an agency's construction of the statute it is
entrusted to administer.47 The first question is whether Congress has

40 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
41

TREATISE

C.

& RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 3.2, at 110 (3d ed. 1994), cited with approval in Barnhart v. Walton,

1 KENNETH

DAVIS

535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
42 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40. The statutory provision may be found at Pub.
L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 747 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §

7502(c)(5) (2000)).
43 Chevron, 467

U.S. at 840, 863-65.

44 E.g., Lamb v. Thompson, 265 F.3d 1038, 1050 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting the
"familiar Chevron two-step analysis").
45 The word "unanimous" here references the absence of any dissent in
Chevron, which was a 6-0 decision. Justices Rehnquist and Marshall did not
participate in the consideration or the decision, and Justice O'Connor did not
participate in the resolution of the case. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
46 Id. at 844.
41

Id. at 842-43.
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directly addressed the particular question of concern. 48 This is
appropriate because the Constitution empowers Congress-not the
executive branch-to legislate the subjects Article I permits.49
Moreover, an agency cannot lawfully promulgate any regulation that
exceeds its statutorily granted authority. 50 In such a case a court must
obey Congress' unambiguous intent. 51 Only when the statute in
question is either ambiguous or silent does the second step of
Chevron become relevant.52
The Court then delineated two separate methods Congress
uses to delegate rulemaking authority to an agency. The first method
is an "express delegation," which occurs when Congress explicitly
leaves a gap in the enabling act for the agency to fill by regulation. 3
That regulation becomes binding legal authority on the courts unless
54
it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
The other method identified by the Court is implicit delegation.55 In
such a case the rule is binding so long as it is "reasonable," even if
the court would have reached a different conclusion.56
The Court further admonished those tempted to attack the
wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than the reasonableness of its
construction:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the
wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who
have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities
for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the
48

Id.

49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
50 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2000) (granting the courts jurisdiction
to hold
unlawful any regulation that exceeds statutory authority).
51 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
52

Id. at 843.

3 Id. at 843-44.
'4

Id. at 844.

55id.
56

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution
vests
57
such responsibilities in the political branches.,
B. Chevron's Evolution and Skidmore's Return
Subsequent to Chevron, judicial deference wavered from the
initial test enunciated by Justice Stevens and his colleagues. The
Court produced a number of inconsistent decisions on how much
respect an agency interpretation was owed.58 In NationsBank of North
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. the Court
unanimously gave controlling weight to a National Bank Act
interpretation by the Comptroller of the Currency that was contained
in a letter.59 A key reason for granting Chevron-deference was the
fact the letter represented the Comptroller's official position, even
though it did not carry the binding legal effect of a legislative
regulation.6 °
1. The Return of Skidmore and the Birth of the "Force of
Law" Requirement
Conspicuously absent from the Court's analysis in Chevron
was any citation to Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,6 1 which provides for a
level of deference the Supreme Court has recently "resurrect[ed].',2
Under Skidmore agency interpretations not meriting Chevron-level
deference 63
were entitled to respect depending upon their "power to
persuade."
The first indicia of Skidmore's return occurred in Christensen

57

Id. at 866 (emphasis added) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.

153, 195 (1978)).
58 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-85 (1992) (illustrating that the Court deferred
the same amount after Chevron as before Chevron).
59 NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
256-58 (1995) (unanimous).
60 Id. at 263.
61

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

62

Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More Piecesfor the

Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54
63 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.

ADMIN.

L. REv. 699, 702 (2002).
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v. Harris County,64 where the Court held that a Department of Labor
opinion letter interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act was not
65
entitled to Chevron-deference because it lacked the "force of law."
The Court held those types of non-authoritative interpretations, such
as agency manuals, policy statements, and enforcement guidelines,
only warranted the judiciary's respect depending on its "power to
persuade." 66 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, hinted that
formal administrative proceedings, such as formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment, were required to invoke the Chevron level of
deference. 67 However, it appeared that Christensen
68 still left absent
any clear line as to the extent of Chevron-deference.
The Court apparently resolved the quandary of Chevron's
limits the following year by reaffirming the "force of law" test in
United States v. Mead Corp., 69 holding that:
[A]dministrative implementation [s] of a particular statutory
provision qualify[y] for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may
be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to

65

529 U.S. 576 (2000).
Id. at 586-87.

66

Id. at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

67

Id. ("Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion

64

letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking.").
68 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations,Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735, 745
(2002).
69 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The Mead case specifically addressed the level of
deference owed to United States Customs tariff classifications. Id. at 221. The
Court held that the classifications were not entitled to Chevron-deference because
such classifications did not carry the force of law. Id. at 234-35. Nonetheless, the
classifications did warrant Skidmore-consideration.Id. at 235. Justice Scalia wrote
a fervent dissent, arguing that the resurrection of the intermediate Skidmore tier
would result in "uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation." Id. at 250
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This comment will not remark on Mead's suitability, but
chooses rather to accept its 8-1 holding as settled law. It should be noted, though,
that Justice Scalia would have granted Chevron-deference to the tariff
classifications based wholly on Chevron's "original formulation" despite the want
of binding legal effect. Id. at 256-57, 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional
intent.7°
Chevron-deference applies, according to the foregoing
explication, when two circumstances are present:71 (1) Congress,
either expressly or impliedly, delegated rulemaking authority to the
interpreting agency; and (2) the agency interpretation was
promulgated in accordance with statutory authority. 72 Justice Souter's
majority opinion therefore equated instances of explicit and implicit
congressional delegation, holding that each circumstance warranted
Chevron-deference. 73 Unlike cases where Congress commands the
agency to fill statutory gaps by regulation, implicit delegation occurs
when it is plain from an agency's "generally conferred authority and
other statutory circumstances" that Congress would expect the
agency to fill non-expressly delegated gaps.7 4 The Court did back
away from Christensen's perceived formality requirement, though it
recognized that formal proceedings in adjudication or rulemaking,
such as notice-and-comment, serve as strong indicia of when
Chevron-deference is due.75 Citing NationsBank, Justice Souter
conceded that Chevron-deference still applied in some circumstances
where an agency interpreted a statute without notice-and-comment
proceedings.
2. Reconciling Chevron and Skidmore
The Court did not stop by merely specifying the occurrence
that would give rise to Chevron-deference. Resolving the ambiguity
left by Christensen, the Court distinguished the two types of
deference that a court can give to an executive statutory
interpretation: the superior Chevron-deference and the lower

70

Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.

71 But see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-3 (requiring that Congress "has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue").
72 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
71

Id. at 229.

74 id.

75 id.
76 Id. at 230 (citing NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 256-57).
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Skidmore-deference.77 According to Mead, Chevron-deference meant
that the reviewing court must apply the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of reasonableness from Section 706(2)(A) of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 78 Prior to Mead, the Supreme Court
had stated that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard required the
court to consider whether the administrative agency failed to base its
decision on relevant factors and whether it clearly erred in
judgment.79 Mead was nothing more than a return to the Court's
original pronouncement in Chevron that a court had no discretion
whatsoever to disregard a permissible agency
interpretation, even if it
80
disagreed with the executive conclusion.
Conversely, Skidmore-deference allows the referring court to
consider an agency's perspective without binding effect. The Mead
Court quoted the Court's unanimous opinion written by Justice
Jackson in Skidmore, which held that judicial deference to agency
interpretations not carrying the force of law "will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade." 8' Simply stated,
the court should consider not only the persuasiveness of the agency's
view, but also the extent of the agency's care, the consistency in its
position, the formalities observed in formulating
its position, and the
82
relative expertise the agency possesses.
3. The Current State of Judicial Deference to Executive
Interpretation
One year later, the Court reaffirmed Mead's disapproval of
Christensen's language which had apparently required notice-andcomment proceedings to invoke Chevron-deference.83 In Barnhartv.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. 837; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
78 Id. at 227 & n.6; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
77

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16
(1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
79

(1977).
80 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
8

Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).

82

Id. (citations omitted).

83

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
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Walton the Court deferred to the Social Security Administration's
interpretation of its enabling act. 84 Applying the Chevron two-step,
the Court accepted the agency's imposition of a twelve-month
requirement for someone to qualify for an "inability" under the Social
Security Act.85 The Court reasoned that the agency construction made
sense, especially in light of its reflection of the agency's longtime
view. 86 In particular the Court stated it granted unique deference to an
agency interpretation that remained the executive view over an
extended period.87
Hence, agency statutory interpretation currently follows the
original Chevron pronouncement: look first to whether Congress'
express intent on the precise issue is present; if that is not present, the
court must then give binding effect to the agency interpretation if it
carries the force of law, unless it was promulgated without reason. 88
Moreover, courts still must accept an interpretation regardless of its
form if it represents the "official view" of the agency and it carries
the force of law. Each of these conditions is present with MagnusonMoss.

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the
Federal Trade Commission's Role Within

Il.

A. The Creation of a Comprehensive Federal Warranty Scheme
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a federal remedial
statute aimed at protecting consumers from unscrupulous
warrantors. 89 Most of the statute's stringent requirements apply only
to written warranties, 90 thereby excluding other types of express
84 Id. at 217.
85 Id. at 218-19.
86 Id. at 219-20.

Id. Notably, the Court reaffirmed Chevron and Barnhart later in 2002,
holding the Interstate Commerce Commission's ("ICC") interpretation of the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act was reasonable and therefore
gave deferential weight to the ICC's interpretation of the ambiguous statute.
Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 46 (2002).
88 Barnhart,535 U.S. at 217-18; Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28; Chevron, 467 U.S.
87

at 842-43.
89 Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1981).
90 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302-04 (2000).
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warranties available under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"). 9' Congress enacted Magnuson-Moss in 1974 to
"improve the adequacy of information available to consumers,
prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of
consumer products., 92 One could say that these purposes share the
common thread of disclosure. 93 The driving force behind MagnusonMoss' enactment rested on over twenty years of examination by the
FTC of warranties, primarily with respect to automobiles and home
appliances. 94 The scope of Magnuson-Moss is much broader though,
as the act applies to "any tangible personal property which is
distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes (including any such property intended
to be attached to or installed in any real property without regard to
whether it is so attached or installed)," collectively referred to as
"consumer products. 95
Magnuson-Moss requires any warrantor to describe its
warranty as either full or limited, with restrictions applying to each
type. 96 Prior to 'Magnuson-Moss, a consumer's only remedies for a
warranty breach existed in the common law and UCC. 9 7 One of the
91 See

U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (2001). The UCC definition of express warranties

subsumes any affirmation of fact, description, model, or sample of the goods that
becomes the basis of the bargain. Id. Consequently, its scope is much broader than
that of Magnuson-Moss.
92 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
93

See infra Part V.B.3.

94 See MMWA HoUSE
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7708-11.

REP.,

supra note 6, at 25-28, reprinted in 1974

9' 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). This article does not address the issue of precisely
what qualifies as a "consumer product." Suffice to say that courts have varied in
their approach to how a specific product's use brings it within the ambit of
Magnsuon-Moss' scope. The majority of jurisdictions hold that a product's normal
use (i.e. how most persons use the product) determines the Act's applicability
rather than how the specific product is actually used. See Cinquergrani v. Sandel
Avionics, No. 01-C-1805, 2001 WL 649488, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2001)
(citations omitted). Contra Lipham v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 So. 2d 190, 194
(Ala. 1995) (holding the specific product's actual use determines Magnuson-Moss'
applicability).
96 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a). Some of the other requirements are quite rigid,
including a prohibition of a warrantor issuing a "full warranty" from disclaiming
implied warranties, such as merchantability or fitness for purpose, see U.C.C. §§ 2314 (merchantability), -315 (fitness for particular purpose). 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2).
97

MMWA HouSE REP., supra note 6, at 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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key additions of Magnuson-Moss to warranty enforcement was the
remedial provision awarding costs and attorneys' fees to a prevailing
consumer, 98 a benefit generally not available under state law unless
the parties specifically agree as such. 99 As a result, consumers can

pursue their breach of warranty claims without fear of the court costs
subsuming the award.
Magnuson-Moss does not mandate that any manufacturer
issue a written warranty. 00 Rather, it requires that if a warrantor
issues a written warranty, it must disclose all terms "fully and
conspicuously."' 01 Congress directed the FTC to determine the extent
of that disclosure,' 0 2 which undoubtedly epitomizes Chevron's
description of an "express delegation" by Congress to fill a statutory
gap.
B. Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures Under MagnusonMoss
Of specific importance to arbitration is a congressional policy
declaration to promote the use of "informal dispute settlement
mechanisms," a policy embedded in Magnuson-Moss' remedial
scheme. 1 4 Congress intended that a totally impartial adjudicator
decide disputes between consumers and warrantors, especially where
a warrantor desired an informal dispute settlement proceeding prior
to any civil action.1°5 To effectuate its policy, Congress provided a
three-part requirement by which an informal dispute settlement
mechanism could serve as a prerequisite to a civil action: (1) the
warrantor must set up the mechanism; (2) the warrantor must ensure
the mechanism complies with FTC regulations; and (3) the written
warranty includes a provision "that the consumer resort to such
procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under this section
at 7706.
98 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).
99 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2001); SHELDON&

CARTER,

supra note 1, § 10.8.

10o See Skelton, 660 F.2d at 314.
" 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
102 See

id.

103

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

104

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).

105

MMWA HouSE REP., supra note 6, at 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 7722.
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' 06 The decision of the mechanism would
respecting
suchevidence
warranty.
be admissible
in any
subsequent judicial proceeding.' 07

1. Arbitration's place as an "informal dispute settlement
mechanism"
Magnuson-Moss does not expressly define "informal dispute
settlement mechanism. ' 0 8 However, the FTC characterized the term
as "an informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated
into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of
[Magnuson-Moss] applies."' 1 9 For instance, a warrantor may
establish a mediation procedure or any separate board to resolve
disputes." 0 In fact one court recently held that one type of a
procedure initiated under FTC regulations did not even invoke the
Arbitration Act."'
At least one commentator has argued that binding arbitration
does not fall within the FTC's definition." 2 The word "arbitration"
appears nowhere in Magnuson-Moss or the FTC regulations." 3 Some
courts holding that Magnuson-Moss may be arbitrated have relied
heavily on this absence.- 14 However, such a view runs afoul of the
106

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(A)-(C).

107

Id. § 2310(a)(3).

'08 See id. § 2301 (defining relevant terms for Magnuson-Moss but refraining
from defining "informal dispute settlement mechanism").
'09

16 C.F.R. § 703.1(e) (2003).

110

See SHELDON&

CARTER,

supra note 1,

§ 10.2.1.2.

111See Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 351 (3d Cir. 1997).
112 See, e.g., Wiechens, supra note 25, at 1472-74 (opining that arbitration is
excluded from the FTC's authority to regulate informal dispute resolution
procedures); see also Ryan Kauffman, Note, Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of
Georgia, Inc.: Will Consumers Be Required to Arbitrate Their Magnuson-Moss
Claims?, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 361, 383 (2002) (quoting Wiechens, supra note
25, at 1469). Wiechens also believes the FTC regulations have no place within the
McMahon framework nor are entitled to any deference under Chevron. See
Wiechens, supra note 25, at 1469-79. As discussed infra, this analysis is flawed.
113 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12; 16 C.F.R. pts. 700-03.
114 See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC, 298 F.3d
470, 475 (5th Cir.
2002) ('The text of the MMWA does not specifically address binding arbitration
. "); In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc. 50 S.W.3d 480, 487 (Tex. 2001)
("[N]either the Magnuson-Moss Act nor the FTC regulations mention arbitration or
the FAA.").

20031
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basic understanding of arbitration. On several occasions the Sulreme
Court has acknowledged the informal nature of arbitration.
In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Inc. decided months before
Magnuson-Moss was enacted, 1 6 the Court compared the arbitral
forum with its judicial counterpart:
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is
not equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the
arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules
of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are
often severely limited or unavailable.... And as this Court
has recognized, '[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the
court to give their reasons for an award'.... Indeed, it is
the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to
function as an efficient, inexpensive,
and expeditious
17
means for dispute resolution."
The National Consumer Law Center has dubbed "untenable" any
attempt to distinguish arbitration from Magnuson-Moss' informal
dispute settlement mechanisms." 8 The FTC concurs, dubbing a
mechanism as any "non-judicial proceeding.' 19 The Supreme Court
120
defers to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation,
consequently dispelling any notion that arbitration is not subsumed in

See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)
(recognizing "informality" as a benefit of arbitration) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (noting informality as an essential
characteristic of arbitration); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (describing arbitration as an "informal...
tribunal").
116 Magnuson-Moss was signed into law on January 4, 1975, see 88 Stat. at
115

2203, whereas Gardner-Denverwas decided February 19, 1974, see 415 U.S. at 36.
117 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 101-112, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2000)).
118 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 1, § 10.2.6.7.
119

FTC IDSM Promulgation, supra note 29, at 60,210.

120

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519

U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
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the definition of "mechanism."' 12 1
2. Distinguishing Between Binding and Non-binding
Arbitration
Non-binding arbitration and other alternative dispute
resolution procedures are not only permissible, but also encouraged
under Magnuson-Moss. 122 No court or party with a sensible mind
would ever argue to the contrary, especially in light of Congress'
codified policy in Magnuson-Moss encouraging informal dispute
resolution. 123 Non-binding arbitration is simply a prerequisite, but not
a bar, to a judicial proceeding. 124 In other words the arbitral forum
under Magnuson-Moss 125
may be an additional hurdle prior to, but not
in lieu of, a civil action.
C. The FTC's Role in Enforcing Magnuson-Moss
Congress delegated to the FTC unique, plenary power to
authoritatively interpret Magnuson-Moss to ensure fulfillment of the
Act's purposes. 126 Section 102(a) of Magnuson-Moss expressly
requires the FTC establish the minimum requirements for the
ingredients in any written warranty. 127 Moreover, Congress explicitly

121 Accord

Lamis, supra note 25, at 189-95.

122 SHELDON

& CARTER, supra note 1,

§ 10.2.1.2; see also 15 U.S.C. §

2310(a)(3).
123 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).
See Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1537 (M.D. Ala.
1997), aff'd without opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Davis v.
S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (1 th Cir. 2002).
125 Accord SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 1, § 10.2.6.2 (stating that
124

Magnuson-Moss "makes the [informal dispute settlement procedures] a nonbinding exhaustion requirement rather than substitute for litigation").
126 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a), 2310(a)(2).
127 Section

102(a) states:

In order to improve the adequacy of information available to
consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the
marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer
product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the
extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously
disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and
conditions of such warranty.
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delegated to the FTC the task of filling the statutory
gaps with respect
128
to any informal dispute settlement proceeding.
The FTC obeyed Congress, establishing the minimum
requirements of any warranty or mechanism. 129 Two sets of
regulations eventually emerged: (1) substantive regulations regarding
the content of warranties and mechanism procedures;' 30 and (2)
interpretive regulations.131
The agency prescribes that all warrantors must "clearly and
conspicuously disclose in a single document in simply and readily
understood language" various terms,' 32 including the warrantor's
identity, 133 the process by which a defect is cured, 134 the warranty's
duration,' 35 and a description of any informal
dispute settlement
36
proceeding established by the warrantor.
However, the rule most antagonistic to binding arbitration
appears in the "interpretive" portion of the Magnuson-Moss
regulations, 37 but it nonetheless carries the force of law.' 38 Section
700.8 of these regulations states:
15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
128

Section 110(a)(2) of Magnuson-Moss requires the FTC to "prescribe rules

setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure
which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision
of [Magnuson-Moss] applies. Such rules shall provide for participation in such
procedure by independent or governmental entities." Id. § 2310(a)(2).
129 See 16 C.F.R. pts. 700-703 (2003).
130 See id. pts. 701-03.
'31

See id. pt. 700.

132

16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a).

133

Id. § 701.3(a)(1).

'34
135

Id. § 701.3(a)(3).
Id. § 701.3(a)(4).

136

Id. § 701.3(a)(6).

137 16 C.F.R. pt. 700 (2003).
138

The generally accepted test for whether a rule has legal effect or is merely

interpretive is two-fold: (1) whether the rule has any present effect; and (2) whether
the agency has some discretion in its application. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir 1987) (citations omitted). Section 700.8 has both
present effect because of its "shall not" language and the FTC did not leave any
room for the rule's application. In light of Magnuson-Moss' acceptance of the rule
as tantamount to law, see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b), the regulation is substantive in
effect.
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A warrantor shall not indicate in any written warranty or
service contract either directly or indirectly that the
decision of the warrantor, service contractor, or any
designated third party is final or binding in any dispute
concerning the warranty or service contract. Nor shall a
warrantor or service contractor state that it alone shall
determine what is a defect under the agreement. Such
statements are deceptive since section 110(d) of the Act
gives state and federal courts jurisdiction
over suits for
1 39
breach of warranty and service contract.
Regarding the actual substantive regulations applicable to the
"mechanisms," the FTC prohibited any warrantor from making a
mechanism a bar to a civil action.' 40 Furthermore, the FTC requires
the warrantor to use the warranty as a means of informing the
consumer that the mechanism's decision is non-binding.1
In 1975 the FTC promulgated Part 703, the set of rules
addressing informal dispute settlement mechanisms, and examined
the legitimacy of the claim that Magnuson-Moss allowed "binding
arbitration."' 1 2 The Commission rejected industry contentions to
allow for "binding arbitration" for two reasons. First, the FTC noted
Congress' intent that all non-judicial proceedings be "nonbinding.' ' 143 Second, the FTC pronounced a policy statement rejecting
any coercion to set up guidelines for binding arbitration procedures:
The Commission is not prepared, at this point in time, to
develop guidelines for a system in which consumers would
commit themselves, at the time of purchase, to resolve any
difficulties in a binding, but non-judicial, proceeding. The
Commission is not now convinced that any guidelines
which it set out could ensure sufficient protection for
consumers. 144

Additionally, the FTC dismissed a belief that Part 703 would never

139

16 C.F.R. § 700.8 (emphasis added).

'40 Id. § 703.5(j) ("Decisions of the Mechanism shall not be legally binding on
any person.").
141

Id. § 703.5(g)(1).

142 See

FTC IDSM Promulgation, supra note 29, at 60,210.

143

Id.

'44

Id (emphasis added).
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allow for binding arbitration. The Commission noted that binding
would be permissible, but only after the dispute had
arbitration
45
arisen.
In 1996 and 1997 the FTC requested commentary regarding
its interpretive and substantive regulations under Magnuson-Moss.4
The Commission accepted these remarks and responded on April 22,
1999, with its final interpretations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, electing to leave both Section 700.8 (Warrantor's Decision as
Final) and Part 703 (Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms)
unchanged.147
The FTC reiterated two important aspects regarding predispute binding arbitration clauses. First, the FTC reaffirmed that
"arbitration" was a possible "informal dispute settlement mechanism"
under Magnuson-Moss. 14 8 Second, the Commission confirmed its
policy of "prohibit[ing] warrantors from including binding arbitration
clauses in their contracts with consumers that would require
consumers to submit warranty disputes to binding arbitration,"
regarding the establishment of
relying in part on its policy statement
149
binding arbitration guidelines.

IV. Federal Arbitration Act and the Three-Part
McMahon Test
Congress enacted the Arbitration Act in 1925 in response to a
wave of judicial hostility toward arbitration contracts that originated
in the English common law. 150 The goal was to bring any agreement
to arbitrate on the "same footing" as any other contract. 15 The
operative section of the Arbitration Act provides that any written
145

Id. at 60,211.

146

See Requests for Comments Concerning Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss

Warranty-Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,688, 14,688 (FTC Apr. 3, 1996) and Request for
Comments Concerning Rule Governing Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures,
62 Fed. Reg. 15,636, 15,636 (FrC Apr. 2, 1997).
147 See Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,703, 19,707 (FrC Apr. 22, 1999).
148 Id. at 19,708 & n.67 (equating "arbitration" with a 703 mechanism).
149

Id. at 19,708-09.

150

EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288-89 (2002) (quoting Gilmer

v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)); Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001).
151

id.
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provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."' 5 2 The Court has construed this section to evince a "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,"'' 53 which invokes a
judicial duty to enforce arbitration agreements even in the face of a
statutory rights claim normally left for the courts.1 54 However, this
should not be confused with a federal policy favoring arbitration in
every case. The Supreme Court stated quite clearly that the goal of
the Arbitration Act was not to endorse the non-judicial resolution of
every dispute; rather, it was merely to advance
a policy enforcing
"privately negotiated arbitration agreements.' 55
A. The McMahon Inquiry
Nonetheless, this policy is not insurmountable. Before the
Arbitration Act even becomes relevant, substantive arbitrability is
decided by a court using ordinary contract construction principles to
determine whether the parties bargained for final arbitration in lieu of
judicial adjudication.' 6 In other words the first inquiry a court
157
undertakes is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.
If the agreement developed in light of "overwhelming economic
power that would provide grounds" for revoking the1 58contract, the
court must, and should, disregard the arbitration clause.
Even if the parties are at arms' length, Congress has the
power to supersede the Arbitration Act's mandate at any time, just as

152

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

153

Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24

(1983).
154Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
155Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 219.
156 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).

Certainly, parties may also agree that substantive arbitrability is for the arbitrator to
decide, but that would be a separate agreement that a court should decide.
157MitsubishiMotors, 473 U.S. at 626.
158Id. at 627 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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it can with any other "statutory directive."' 159 In Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon the Supreme Court pronounced that the
Arbitration Act would subside if a party could show "Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies."' 60 The burden
rests solely on the party resisting arbitration. 16 1 McMahon recognized
three factors from which a court may derive such congressional
intent: (1) the text of the statute; (2) the act's legislative history; or
(3) an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying
purposes of the act granting statutory rights.1 62 This test is
disjunctive; that is, the party seeking to avoid arbitration mayl show
such congressional intent from any one of the three sources. 6 The
Court has never stated that Congress must explicitly pronounce the
statute in question overrides 1the
64 Arbitration Act, despite the view
enunciated by the Davis court.

B. Other Statutory Rights v. The Arbitration Act
Even before McMahon and in the years following, the
Supreme Court routinely denied efforts to evade the Arbitration Act's
directive, siding with the Arbitration Act in its confrontations with
each of the following federal statutes: the Sherman Antitrust Act
166
("Sherman Act"), 165 the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")"167
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Securities Exchange Act")"
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 168 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"). 169 Indirectly, the Court has also rejected a challenge to

159

Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).

'60

Id. at 227.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

See id. (using the disjunctive word "or" instead of the conjunctive word

"and").
164

See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1273.

165

Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 636.

'66 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84
(1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
167 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-38.

"6
169

Id. at 238-42.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 U.S. 20, 26-35 (1991).
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avoid arbitration under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). 170 In spite
of this freight train against judicial adjudication, Magnuson-Moss,
coupled with its corresponding FTC regulations, embodies the
congressional intent the Court envisioned in McMahon.
Magnuson-Moss is fundamentally different from those
arbitrable statutes. The Court upheld arbitration in the cases
addressing the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. and
McMahon, because the statutes only contained a conferral of
jurisdiction to the federal courts and provisions which prohibited
waiver of any right granted by the act. 17 Indeed, the McMahon Court
recognized federal regulations explicitly approving binding
arbitration for claims under the securities laws. 172 The FTC
regulations under Magnuson-Moss, on the other hand, explicitly
forbid binding arbitration clauses in the warranty. 173 The Sherman
Act is equally distinguishable, as the consumer's claim to supersede
the Arbitration Act does not depend exclusively on the "importance
of the private damages remedy. ' 74 RICO, the other statute
considered by the McMahon Court, contained nothing in the text or
legislative history that could even purport to show congressional
intent to override the Arbitration Act, and the Court rejected the
"public importance" argument analogous to the one made for the
175
Sherman Act.
Another case cited by arbitration proponents is Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,17 6 the Supreme Court case which held
Moreover, the Court has rejected attempts to escape arbitration in other contexts.
See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001) (employment
contracts); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (state tort
law); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (international

contracts).
170

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2001). As shown infra

Part V.B.3, this decision does not undercut Magnuson-Moss' usurpation of the
Arbitration Act.
171 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482-83; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 22734.
172

See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234.

113See infra Part

V.A.

174

Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 635.

175

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 240 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at

635).
176

500 U.S. 20 (1991), discussed in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC, 298
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ADEA claims arbitrable. 177 The appellant in Gilmer relied solely on
the purported social policies in the ADEA while fully conceding no
congressional intent to supplant the Arbitration Act lied in the text or
legislative history. 178 Additionally, the public disclosure problem was
resolved through New York Stock Exchange rules requiring publicity
of the arbitrators' decisions. 179 Such is not the case with binding
arbitration in the consumer context. 180 The congressional intent
sought after by the Court in McMahon is present in Magnuson-Moss:
federal breach of warranty claims are resolved ultimately in the
courts.

Magnuson-Moss Precludes the Consumer from
Waiving the Judicial Forum

V.

Pre-dispute arbitration clauses are illegal under MagnusonMoss whether the clause is in the warranty itself 18 1 or a different
document. 182 The FTC regulations make this evident in light of
Chevron's evolution.
A. FTC Regulations that Prohibit Waiving the Judicial Forum
Warrant the Highest Judicial Deference
The FTC regulations promulgated pursuant to MagnusonMoss authority rest on par with a federal statute, as if Congress itself
passed the law. 83 Accordingly, the FTC regulations, if permissible
under Magnuson-Moss, must be considered under the McMahon
inquiry.
The first question to consider is whether Congress has
expressly permitted final and binding arbitration clauses for
Magnuson-Moss claims.' 84 Generally, one might argue that Congress
F.3d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 2002).
177 Id. at 26-35.
178 Id. at

26-28.

"' See id. at 31-32.
180 See infra Part V.B.3.
181

16 C.F.R. §§ 700.8, 703.5(j) (2003).

182

Id. § 703.2.

183

See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (citing Chevron,

467 U.S. at 844).
184 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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has spoken on the issue with the Arbitration Act, as it makes all
' 85
arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."'
However, the first prong of the Chevron two-step narrows the inquiry
to whether "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue."' 86 Were there language in Magnuson-Moss expressly
permitting binding arbitration, then the FTC regulations would be
completely void. Such wording is not in Magnuson-Moss, properly
permitting-and requiring-a court to proceed to the second Chevron
step.
Moreover, Magnuson-Moss remained unborn fifty years after
the Arbitration Act passed, and at least arguably preserves a judicial
forum subsequent to any informal dispute settlement procedure under
its auspices. 187 As some courts have recognized, the word
"arbitration" does not even appear in Magnuson-Moss' text, only the
term "informal dispute settlement procedure."' 188 Since MagnusonMoss is ambiguous and silent to final and binding pre-dispute
arbitration, the FTC's gap-filling regulations are controlling on the
courts unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
[Magnuson-Moss]. ,189
1. The Weight of Deference Owed to the FTC
Over time, Congress has delegated to the FTC an
uncommonly great weight of responsibility to administer the most
significant federal consumer protection statutes.' 90 The Supreme

185

9 U.S.C. § 2. This is the precise argument taken by two commentators who

dismiss the FTC's view under part one of the Chevron two-step. See Wiechens,
supra note 25, at 1478, 1481; Kauffman, supra note 112, at 384.
186 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
187

See infra Part V.B. 1.

188

See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir.

2002); In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 487 (Tex. 2001).
189 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
190 These statutes include the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), the Wheeler-Lea
Act (1938), the Consumer Credit Protection Acts (1968-78), the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act (1975), the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (1976),
the FTC Improvements Act of 1980, the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute
Resolution Act (1992), the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
(1994), and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
(1994). See CQ Press, 2001/Winter FederalStaff Directory 965 (35th ed. 2001).
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Court long ago in FTC v. Cement Institute19 1 singled out the
Commission as one agency deserving higher deference than other
executive bureaus. Specifically, the 192
Court explained the "great
weight" it gave to FTC determinations:
We are persuaded that the Commission's long and close
examination of the question it here decided has provided it
with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of
its statutory duty. The kind of specialized knowledge
Congress wanted its agency to have was an expertness that
would fit it to stop at the threshold every unfair trade
practice-that kind of practice, which if left alone,
'destroys competition['] .... 193
This description coincidentally foreshadowed the Court's opinion in
Mead.194 Furthermore, Title II of Magnuson-Moss expanded the
FTC's powers,1 95 showing concurrent congressional intent to
strengthen the foremost consumer protection agency.
The FTC deserves the highest deference a court can grant an
agency. Magnuson-Moss exemplifies the explicit and implicit
delegation expounded by the Mead Court. 19 6 Specifically, Congress
delegated gap-filling responsibilities to the FTC with respect to
warranty content and informal dispute settlement procedures."' This
express delegation of authority derived from Magnuson-Moss is
equally if not more 9explicit
than the Court reviewed in Chevron or in
8
progeny.
its
of
any
Some have argued, however, that the FTC regulations should
not be considered at all to resolve this issue because Magnuson-Moss
191

FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948), cited for same

proposition in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 251 n.4 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
192 Id. (citations omitted).

194

Id. (citing FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647, 650 (1931)).
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28.

195

Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,

193

Pub. L. No. 93-637, Title II, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193-2203 (1975) (codified as amended
throughout Title 15, U.S.C. (2000)); see also MMWA HouSE REP., supra note 6, at
20, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7702.
196

See discussion and notes supra Part III.B-C.
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15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a), 2310(a)(2).
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See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.
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does not give the FTC the power to override the Arbitration Act.' 99
This view does not comport with Chevron and its progeny, which
hold reasonable regulations promulgated under statutory authority are
the functional equivalent of Congress' words-that is, they are
controlling on the courts, and no court has the power to set aside the
regulation merely because it disagrees with the policy. 200 Thus,
Congress can authorize an agency to override the Arbitration Act's
mandate so long as the agency has authority to establish guidelines,
thresholds, and prohibitions for arbitral proceedings-precisely the
case with Magnuson-Moss.
2. Arbitration Clauses Inside the Warranty
Indisputably, federal regulatory law prohibits a final and
binding arbitration clause located in the warranty. 2 1 The FTC
additionally requires the warrantor to inform the consumer that the
mechanism's decision is non-binding. 20 2 FTC regulations
subsequently reiterate that "[d]ecisions of the Mechanism shall not be
legally binding on any person." 20 3 By statute, violating any of these
regulations circuitously
violates the original Federal Trade
20 4
Act.
Commission
Section 700.8, which prohibits any indication that a nonjudicial decision is final and binding, declares its rationale to be the
jurisdictional conferral on the courts. 205,The Davis court 206
highlighted
this reasoning for the regulation's alleged illegitimacy.
When a
rule is promulgated under explicit or implicit congressional
delegation of authority, the resulting regulation becomes the

'99 See Wiechens, supra note 25, at 1469; Kauffman, supra note 112, at 384
(quoting Wiechens, supra note 25, at 1469).
200 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); United States v. Mead

Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
20'

16 C.F.R. § 700.8 (2003).

202

Id. § 703.5(g)(1).

203

Id. § 703.50).

204

15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) ("It shall be a violation of section 45(a)(1) of this title

for any person to fail to comply with any requirement imposed on such person by
this chapter (or a rule thereunder) or to violate any prohibition contained in this
chapter (or a rule thereunder).") (emphasis added).
205 16 C.F.R. § 700.8.
206

Davis, 305 F.3d at 1279.
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equivalent of congressional text: it is controlling on the courts. 20 7 It is
usurious at best to claim that a regulation mandating a final public
adjudicative forum is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary ' 2° 8 to a disclosure statute. Moreover, the FTC pronounced a
policy of not establishing any guidelines to aid arbitral forums that
were binding in nature. 09 As the Court stated in Chevron, any
attempt to21convince
the judiciary to second-guess the agency's policy
0
must fail.
3. Arbitration Clauses Outside the Warranty
Magnuson-Moss and its corresponding FTC regulations
concomitantly prohibit final and binding arbitration clauses located
separate from the written warranty for two reasons. First, as one
federal district court put it, "[i]t is a well-settled principle of law that
one cannot do indirectly what cannot be done directly. ' 211 Section
700.8, plainly prohibiting final and binding arbitration clauses in the
warranty, would be rendered inconsequential if creditors or
merchants could circumvent the rule by placing the clause in another
document.
Second, and even more convincing, is Magnuson-Moss'
directive to disclose all material terms "fully and conspicuously" in
the warranty.212 Binding arbitration is a term generally held to be so
material to the terms of an agreement that its unilateral insertion by a
single party alters the agreement.2 13 The non-existence of any federal
contract law is irrelevant, as courts will not enforce illegal promises
in cases involving federal law.214 Arbitration clauses, due to their
U.S. at 227-29.

207

Mead, 533

208

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

209

FTC IDSM Promulgation, supra note 29, at 60,210.

210

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.

211

In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197, 2001 WL 849928, at *2 n.4

(D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2001).
212 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a); see also Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga.,
Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 622 (11th Cir. 2001) (Magnuson-Moss requires the
manufacturer to "disclose in a single document all relevant terms of the
warranty.").
213 Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375, 379
(5th Cir. 1981); accord 1 ARTHuR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
at 507 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993).
214 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982).
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materiality, would have to appear in the warranty to be enforceable
under Magnuson-Moss. 215 Since final and binding arbitration clauses
are flatly prohibited by reasonable regulations, they have no place
near a warranty.
B. Application of the Traditional McMahon Inquiry
The FTC regulations are dispositive of the issue, but even if
one were to disregard the regulations, Magnuson-Moss itself satisfies
the McMahon test as it evinces congressional intent to preclude a
consumer from foregoing her right to courts. Though the McMahon
inquiry is disjunctive, Magnuson-Moss satisfies each factor.
1. Magnuson-Moss' Text
Proper statutory construction of the entire remedial section of
Magnuson-Moss demonstrates congressional intent to preserve a
public judicial forum. Though Magnuson-Moss does codify
Congress' policy to encourage warrantors to establish informal
dispute settlement procedures,7 1 courts should look at the entire
remedies section and "fit, if possible, all parts into an [sic]
harmonious whole." 217 The Supreme Court has said that "statutory
construction 'is a holistic endeavor' and that the meaning of a
provision is 'clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme...
[when] only one of the permissible meanings produces
a substantive
21 8
law.'
the
of
rest
the
with
compatible
is
that
effect
The remedies section in Magnuson-Moss creates a cause of
action for consumers injured by violations of its provisions, with
concurrent jurisdiction in both the federal and state courts. 2 19 It is
settled that this jurisdictional conferral, standing alone, would be
insufficient to override the Arbitration Act.2 20 However, Magnuson215

15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).

216

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).

FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959) (citing Black v. Magnolia
Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24, 26 (1957)).
218 United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 217-18
(2001) (alteration in original) (quoting United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
217

219

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).

220

See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987),

followed in Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482-85.
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Moss does not end there. The only blockade to a civil action a
consumer would face arises only if the warrantor informs the
consumer in the warranty that, inter alia, "the consumer resort to
such procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under this section
respecting such warranty." 221 A canon of statutory construction
dictates that Congress said what it meant in Magnuson-Moss and
meant what the Act's language stated.222 Consequently, the remedial
section envisions a judicial forum for the consumer after the
conclusion of any informal dispute mechanism proceedings.
Additionally, Magnuson-Moss statutorily ordains that "[i]n
any civil action arising out of a warranty obligation and relating to a
matter considered in such a procedure, any decision in such
procedure shall be admissible in evidence" to assist the federal or
state court in its judicial adjudication. 2 23 To ignore the one-way street
from the informal decision to the judicial system "would subvert the
plain meaning of the statute, making its mandatory language merely
permissive. " 2 4 Allowing final and binding arbitration as a dispute
settlement procedure for Magnuson-Moss claims would circumvent
the congressionally mandated pathway to the judiciary. Also, it must
be remembered that the FTC regulations promulgated under
Congress' directive carry the weight of legislative text, as if they are
Congress' words.
2. Magnuson-Moss' Legislative History
The legislative history of Magnuson-Moss equally, if not
more so, evinces Congress' intent to leave unfettered the consumer's
right to the judiciary. Two of Congress' primary purposes in enacting
Magnuson-Moss were to make consumer product warranties "more
readily understood and enforceable" and to provide the FTC with
better means of protecting consumers.226 The House Report to
Magnuson Moss unequivocally states that "[a]n adverse decision in
any informal dispute settlement proceeding would not be a bar to a
221

15 U.S.C § 2310(a)(3)(C).

222

See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations

omitted), remanded to 988 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1993).
223

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).

224

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000).

225

Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.

226

MMWA HOUSE REP., supra note 6, at 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 7702.
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' 227
civil action on the warranty involved in the proceeding."
Moreover, the Report confirmed the legislative directive requiring the
admissibility of the informal mechanism's decision in any subsequent
civil action, which preserves a judicial forum after any adverse nonbinding decision.228
Additionally, Senator Moss, one of the sponsors of
Magnuson-Moss, furthered this view in preliminary deliberations:

[T]he bill is further refined so as to place a minimum extra
burden on the courts by requiring as a prerequisite to suit
that the purchaser give the supplier reasonable opportunity
to settle the dispute out of court, including the use of a fair
and formal dispute settlement mechanism which the bill
encourages suppliers to set up9 under the supervision of the
Federal Trade Commission.
The legislative history of Magnuson-Moss simply confirms
what its text mandates: that informal dispute settlement procedures,
while permissible to use as prerequisites to suit, can never be used to
eliminate the statutory right to go to court.
3. Magnuson-Moss' Underlying Purposes
Public disclosure and consumer knowledge lie at the heart of
Magnuson-Moss. The three main purposes behind Magnuson-Moss
are: (1) "improve the adequacy of information available to
consumers"; (2) "prevent deception"; and (3) "improve competition
in the marketing of consumer products., 230 The privatization of
Magnuson-Moss claims through binding arbitration bars entry into
the judicial system, thereby undermining each of these codified
purposes.
Furthermore, breach of warranty adjudication in federal and
state court results in publicized decisions that are available in law
Id. at 41, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7723. The Supreme Court,
when considering legislative history, prefers to "consult the documents prepared by
Congress when deliberating," namely House and Senate Reports. Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 580 (1995).
228 MMWA HOUSE REP., supra note 6, at 41, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
227

at 7723.
119 CONG. REC. 972 (1973) (statement of Sen. Moss), quoted in Parkerson
v. Smith, 2000-CA-00549-SCT, 13, 817 So. 2d 529, 533 (Miss. 2002).
230 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
229
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libraries, full depository public libraries, and the Internet legal
databases. These public decisions enumerate the deceptive acts and
practices of both producers and retailers of faulty products.
Competitive pressures will not allow a substandard producer to
remain in the marketplace.
The leading agency responsible for conducting arbitral forums
is the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").231 Rules of the
AAA do not require any written or reasoned decision by an
arbitration panel. 232 A party does not even receive a copy of the
arbitration decision unless a specific request is made.233 Moreover,
one of the touted advantages of AAA arbitration is the privatization
of claims.2 34 No public disclosure is made. This privatization is an
anathema to disclosure.235
One might contend, however, that the Supreme Court has
already rejected this argument. 236 In Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph the Court rejected a consumer's attempt to circumvent the
Coincidentally, TILA's
Arbitration Act with a claim under TILA.
238
codified purposes are analogous to those of Magnuson-Moss.
Nevertheless, TILA and Magnuson-Moss are fundamentally different
statutes despite their common thread of consumer protection. A
consumer or debtor aggrieved by a TILA violation can still use the
loan, even if the terms of the loan are unlawful. 239 A Magnuson-Moss
231

See

AM. ARB. ASS'N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION 1, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15765

(last visited

Oct. 20, 2003).
232 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES

R-42.b

(American Arbitration Association, as amended and effective on July 1, 2003),
available at http://www.adr.org.
233 Id.
234

Id.

235 Cf Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (listing the

shortcomings of arbitration vis-A-vis judicial adjudication).
236 E.g., Kauffman, supra note 112, at 382 ("Most recently, the Court upheld
the arbitration for claims arising under the Truth in Lending Act, which, like
Magnuson-Moss, was designed to protect consumers.") (footnotes omitted).
237 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 84 (2000).
238

See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (describing the purposes of TILA as "a

meaningful disclosure of credit terms" and consumer protection of improper billing
practices).
239 E.g., In re Barber, 266 B.R. 309, 313-14 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (plaintiff
still used loan proceeds although defendants "took advantage" of plaintiff).
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plaintiff does not even get the benefit of the bargain. Rather, the
buyer of defective goods does not even get full usage, if usage at all,
out of the product she purchased.
Moreover, the Court in Green Tree, while involving an
attempt to avoid arbitrating a claim under the TILA, did not address
the specific issue of whether TILA overrode the Arbitration Act's
mandate as the plaintiff never made such a contention. 240 Rather,
Green Tree addressed (1) whether a district court's order directing
arbitration to proceed and dismissal of claims was a "final decision
with respect to an arbitration" under Section 16 of the Arbitration
,Act, and (2) whether an arbitration clause that mentioned nothing
about exorbitant costs would render the agreement enforceable. 24,
The Court held the plaintiff had not met her burden of showing that
the arbitral costs in that specific case were too excessive and that
would revoke the arbitration contract. 242 In short Green Tree does not
provide a sufficient basis for
243 accepting pre-dispute binding
arbitrability of Magnuson-Moss.

VI. Conclusion
Arbitration, in some circumstances, may be a viable option
for many parties. The informality can certainly prove beneficial in
some circumstances. However, because of the requisite disclosure
that judicial adjudication provides and arbitration conceals,
244
consumers must be granted unwaivable access to the judiciary.
Despite the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,245 the
Court must not simply rubber stamp every arbitration agreement.
Under Magnuson-Moss there is an equally strong federal policy
rebuking pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements contained in
240

Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.

241

Id. at 82.

242

Id. at 92.

Some commentators have contended that the Arbitration Act was intended
initially "to settle disputes between businesses," and not consumers. See Michael
D. Donovan & David A. Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers:
How to Combat OverreachingArbitration Clauses, 10 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv.
269, 270 (1998). As persuasive as this contention is, the Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the argument. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989).
244 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 18, § 5.2.2.5.1.
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McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
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warranties. 246 The Court would set a dangerous precedent by siding
with the Arbitration Act when this issue finally reaches the nine
justices, as it would be forced to set aside federal regulations
promulgated under congressional248
directive.247 This result would be
wholly repugnant under Chevron.
Allowing the consumer an "unwaivable access to the
courts ' 2 4 9 would also further Magnuson-Moss' goal of providing
disclosure to the consumers. 20 The judgments rendered in the public
setting unquestionably would reach the doorstep of the average
consumer, who would then be better informed of which warrantors
continuously failed to fulfill their promises. The Court does not have
to play "legal gymnastics,' 251 to vault Magnuson-Moss over the
Arbitration Act. It need only follow Chevron, a task it has undertaken
over 150 times already.

- See supra Part V.
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